TABLE OF
CONTENTS
CHAPTER 1 Introduction ………………………………………………………………………… 1
CHAPTER 2 The Project ………………………………………………………………………… 2
CHAPTER 3 Major Environmental, Economic, Social, and
Political Issues ……………… 3
CHAPTER 4 Economic and Financial Costs ……………………………………………………………………….. 4
CHAPTER 5 Environmental Impacts …………………………………………………………………………
5
CHAPTER 6 Fisheries ……………………………………………………………………….. 6
CHAPTER 7 River Sediment Flow
………………………………………………………………………… 7
CHAPTER 8 Flood Protection ………………………………………………………………………… 8
CHAPTER 9 Shipping Benefits ………………………………………………………………………… 9
CHAPTER 10 Reservoir
………………………………………………………………………… 10
CHAPTER 11 Relocation and Resettlement ………………………………………………………………………… 11
CHAPTER 12 Other Issues ………………………………………………………………………… 12
CHAPTER 13 Conclusion ………………………………………………………………………… 13
CHAPTER 14 References ………………………………………………………………………….. 14
TABLE OF
FIGURES
Figure 1 The Three Gorges Dam
Figure 2 The Project
Figure 3 The Yangtze River
Figure 4 Financial Costs
Figure 5 Satellite View Of River
Figure 6 Fishing
Figure 7 Effect On Soil
Figure 8 Impact Of Dam On Agriculture
Figure 9 Flood Water
Figure 10 Ship Lift
Figure 11 Ship Locks
Figure 12 Reservoir
Figure 13 Reservoir
Figure 14 Relocation
Figure 15 Resettlement
Figure 16 Submerged Area Issues
Figure 17 Water
Pollution
Figure 18 The Night View Of TheThree Gorges Dam
Figure 19 Three Gorges Dam At Its Fullest
Chapter:-1
Introduction :-
The Three
Gorges Dam (TGD) and associated infrastructure is the largest integrated water
project built in the history of the world. It has also been one of the most
controversial due to its massive environmental, economic, and social impacts.
The very first volume of The World’s Water, published more than a decade ago,
reviewed the plans underway at that time to build the Three Gorges Dam, along
with many of the expected benefits and costs (Gleick 1998). A decade later, the
physical dam itself has largely been completed, although work is continuing on
electrical generating systems and a wide range of peripheral projects. This
chapter offers an update on the project and a timeline of major events. It is
crucial to note that while extensive information on the project is available
from authorities and government officials, reliable independent information on
environmental and social costs is harder to find (Dai 1994, 1998; Heggelund
2007). This update draws on official materials, as well as information
available from non-governmental and non-Chinese sources, to get a clearer
snapshot of the project’s complex implications. There are growing indications
that very serious problems have started to develop. In the summer of 2007,
major western media began to report on growing threats from landslides, pollution,
and flooding, as well as growing social and political unrest and
dissatisfaction associated with relocating millions of people (Oster 2007,
Yardley 2007). Even officials in China have begun to be increasingly outspoken
about unresolved challenges associated with the project. Weng Lida, secretary
general of the Yangtze River Forum was quoted as saying “the problems are all
more serious than we expected” (Oster 2007). In September 2007, Chinese
officials “admitted the Three Gorges Dam project has caused an array of
ecological ills, including more frequent landslides and pollution, and if
preventive measures are not taken, there could be an environmental
‘catastrophe’ “ (Xinhua 2007c). The complex and massive effort to relocate
millions of displaced and affected people has also caused a range of social,
political, and economic problems. It is impossible to try to judge whether the
TGD project will have net costs or benefits. All major water projects have
complicated combinations of both costs and benefits that vary over a project’s
lifetime and are difficult to evaluate and quantify in a 139 consistent,
comparable way. As is typical with such large water projects, the benefits are
typically far easier to identify and quantify than the costs, which often only
manifest themselves over many years, in complex ways. Calculating actual costs
and benefits accurately may never be possible because of the difficulty of
putting monetary values on many of the complex environmental, social, and
cultural impacts of the project (Tan and Yao 2006). Nevertheless, enough time
has gone by, and enough information is available, to begin the process of
evaluating the overall implications of the project.
1
Chapter:-2
The Project:-
The Three Gorges Dam stretches more
than two kilometers across one of the greatest rivers in the world, the
Yangtze. The dam was built in a stretch of the Yangtze known as Three Gorges
because of the canyons formed by immense limestone cliffs. These gorges— the
Xiling, Wu, and Qutang—offer some of the most scenic landscape anywhere in the
world and have long been a destination spot for tourists from around the world.
In recent years, tourism has boomed as people have rushed to see some of the
sights to be destroyed by the dam and reservoir (China View 2008). The beauty
of the region has inspired Chinese poets and artists for centuries including
much of the work of Li Bai (701–762 AD), considered by many Chinese to be the
world’s greatest poet (Fearnside 1988). The idea of building a gigantic dam on
the Yangtze River in the Three Gorges area was proposed more than 80 years ago
by Sun Yat-sen. After severe flooding along the river in the 1950s, Chairman
Mao Tse Tung vowed to speed up construction of a massive dam but nothing
significant happened for several more decades. In 1986, the Chinese Ministry of
Water Resources and Electric Power asked the Canadian government to finance a
feasibility study to be conducted by a consortium of Canadian firms. The
consortium, known as CIPM Yangtze Joint Venture, included three private
companies (Acres International, SNC, and Lavelin International), and two
state-owned utilities (Hydro-Quebec International and British Columbia Hydro
International). The World Bank was asked to supervise the feasibility study to
ensure that it would “form the basis for securing assistance from international
financial institutions” (Adams 1997). On April 3, 1992, the National People’s
Congress officially approved the construction of the project. On December 14,
1994, the Chinese government formally began construction. The first electricity
was produced in 2003, and the physical dam was mostly completed in 2006. The
Three Gorges Dam is nearly 200 meters high, has a volume of 40 million cubic
meters, and has created a reservoir 600-kilometer long with a total storage
capacity approaching 40 billion cubic meters. Maximum storage of water behind
the dam is expected to occur sometime in 2008. The 14 generators in the north
side of the dam have already been installed and they reached full capacity
(9,800 MWe) on October 18, 2006 after the water level in the reservoir had been
raised to 156 meters. Installation of seven generators in the south side of the
dam was completed by the end of 2007, bringing the total power capacity to
14,800 MWe, surpassing the generating capacity of the Itaipu Dam (14,000 MWe)
in Brazil (Government of China 2006). At its completion, sometime after 2010,
the project is expected to have a total installed hydroelectric capacity
exceeding 22,000 MWe. This power capacity is higher than originally proposed
because of an expansion initiated in 2002. In 2007, the turbines generated
around 62 billion kWhr of electricity – about two-thirds of the maximum level
expected by the completed project. Other benefits of the project claimed by
project designers include 140 The World’s Water 2008–2009 flood protection on
the historically dangerous Yangtze River and improvements to river navigation
for thousands of kilometers.
2
Chapter:-3
Major Environmental, Economic, Social, and Political Issues:-
Economic, environmental, social, and political
concerns have been raised about the TGD project, both before the project was
launched and in recent years. One of the strongest and most consistent
arguments made by project proponents has been that the electricity produced by
the dam would otherwise be produced by dirty Chinese coalburning power plants,
with their serious environmental impacts. One of the strongest and most
consistent arguments made by project opponents has been the vast scale of the environmental
and social transformations of the watershed of the Yangtze both upstream and
downstream of the dam itself. These major questions are addressed here.
3
Chapter:-4
Economic and Financial Costs :-
The total cost of the Three Gorges
Dam and associated projects will be enormous, but it is no longer possible to
produce any definitive quantitative estimate. Even the financial costs of the
infrastructure alone cannot be known because of the magnitude of the
expenditures, the related development projects in the region, and expenditures
made unofficially. Estimates of the construction costs made during the
mid-1990s for the major parts of the project ranged from a low of $25 billion
to a high of $60 billion (Dai 1994, China 1996, JPN 1996, McCully 1996, Reuters
1997). The most recent estimates have fluctuated around the upper end of these
figures. The TGD is being funded by a complex mix of both internal and external
sources. China has identified four internal sources of funds: the State Three
Gorges Construction Funds, power revenues from existing hydropower facilities,
power revenues from the Three Gorges Project itself, and loans and credits from
the Chinese State Development Bank (SDB), now renamed the Chinese Development
Bank (CDB). External sources of funding have been critical for the project.
International organizations have tried to maintain a list of international
financiers and companies supplying equipment and services to the project
through the China Three Gorges Project Development Corporation, a state-owned
entity set up to finance and build the project (see, especially, Probe
International 2008). Canada’s Export Development Corporation, Germany’s
export-import bank, and other international export credit agencies provided
early loan guarantees for the project totaling hundreds of millions of dollars
(Financial Times 1997). Commercial banks and investment firms have offered
significant financing assistance. The SDB of China signed a loan package with
Germany’s Kreditanstalt Fur Wiederaufbau, Dresdner Bank, and DG Bank in 1997
for the purchase of turbines and generators. Hundreds of millions of dollars in
SDB bonds were underwritten at the beginning of the project by a virtual who’s
who of the international financial community, including Lehman Brothers, Credit
Suisse First Boston, Smith Barney Inc, J.P. Morgan & Co, Morgan Stanley
& Co Incorporated, and BancAmerica Securities Inc.
4
Chapter:-5
Environmental
Impacts:-
Much of China’s electricity is produced by
thermal power plants burning one of the dirtiest fossil fuels – coal. The
Chinese government estimates that if the electricity generated by the Three
Gorges project were produced instead with Chinese coal, 50 million more tons of
coal would be burned annually, producing 100 million tons of carbon dioxide,
1.2–2 million tons of sulfur dioxide, 10,000 tons of carbon monoxide, and large
quantities of particulates (China 1996, Xinhua 2007a). Government officials also
point to efforts to remove polluting enterprises from the edge of the river or
reservoir, and their construction of sewage treatment facilities to improve
water quality in the Three Gorges reservoir region, although they note that
eutrophic conditions and algal blooms continue to occur throughout the basin
(People’s Daily Online 2007). In addition, while massive funding has been
committed to the dam itself, much of the proposed spending on pollution control
has not yet occurred. Officials estimate that about 40 billion yuan will be
spent to build at least 150 sewage treatment plants and 170 urban garbage
disposal centers, but many of these are not yet complete (China Daily 2007a).
The city of Chongqing alone still releases nearly one billion tons of untreated
wastewater into the Three Gorges reservoir every year (Hodum 2007).
5
Chapter:-6
Fisheries :-
Impacts Ecological problems have been projected to occur as a result of
the construction of the dam and modification of the watershed, including impacts
on the fisheries of the Yangtze River basin. This basin has 36 percent of all
freshwater fish species in China, with more than 360 fish species belonging to
29 families and 131 genera (Xie 2003). Twenty-seven percent of all of China’s
endangered freshwater fish are in the Yangtze basin, and there are as many as
177 endemic fish species (Yue and Chen 1998). Major changes in fish populations
have been anticipated because the project is altering the dynamics of the
river, the chemical and temperature composition of the water, and the character
of the natural habitat and food resources available for these fish species. The
dam itself blocks migration of fish and access to spawning grounds, and these
impacts will be imposed on top of other significant modifications to the
Yangtze that have already caused declines in fisheries. In 1981, the Chinese
completed the construction of the Gezhou Dam 40 kilometers downstream from the
TGD site. That was followed by rapid and sharp declines in the populations of
three of China’s famous ancient fish species, the Chinese sturgeon, River
sturgeon, and Chinese paddlefish, each of which is now listed as endangered
(Xie 2003). Of special concern is the Chinese freshwater dolphin, which may
already be extinct (Hance 2008). Fisheries in the upper watershed are also at
risk. A study in 2003 identified six species at high risk 142 The World’s Water
2008–2009 of complete extinction, another 14 with an uncertain future, and two
dozen more that may only survive in tributaries to the Yangtze (Park et al.
2003). Fisheries are already beginning to show the effects of altered river
ecology below the dam. Data released to a Three Gorges Dam monitoring program
website indicate that commercial harvests of four species of carp are well below
pre-dam levels (Xie et al. 2007)
6
Chapter:-7
River Sediment Flow:-
The dam is also having a significant impact on
sediment loads in the Yangtze. The Yangtze River has traditionally carried a
vast load of sediment from its upper reaches of the watershed to the East China
Sea, supporting ecological processes in the river delta and the productivity of
fisheries in the Sea. This sediment load has varied with annual climatic
factors, and more significantly, with the level of deforestation, and
subsequent reforestation in the upper watershed. The completion of the Three
Gorges Dam, however, has led to a rapid and significant decrease in downstream
sediment load. Sediment volumes have been declining from the late 1990s due to
reforestation efforts and the construction of many small- and
intermediate-sized dams on Yangtze River tributaries. In 2003, the closure of
the Three Gorges Dam caused a further severe decrease. Sediment load at Datong,
near the Yangtze’s delta dropped to only 33 percent of the 1950–1986 levels (Xu
et al. 2006). Among the consequences of this drop in sediment are growing
coastal erosion and a change in the ecological characteristics and productivity
of the East China Sea (Xu et al. 2006).
7
Chapter:-8
Flood Protection :-
A major
anticipated benefit of the project is improved flood protection on the middle
and lower reaches of the Yangtze River. Historically, people living along the
Yangtze River have suffered tremendous losses from flooding. In 1931, 145,000
people drowned, and over 300,000 hectares of agricultural land flooded. In
1954, 30,000 more died in Yangtze floods or the subsequent diseases (Boyle
2007). In 1998, a flood in the same area caused billions of dollars of damage.
More than two thousand square kilometers of farm land was flooded, and over
1,500 people were killed (CTGPC 2002). The Chinese government has already
claimed flood benefits to the dam. According to Li Yongan, the general manager
of the Yangtze Three Gorges Project Development Office, the project averted
floods in late July 2007 by storing waters that would have exceeded flood
levels below the dam (People’s Daily Online 2007), though the overall long-term
flood-control benefits provided by the Three Gorges Dam are only likely to be
determined over the next several decades as a wider range of high flows are
experienced.
8
Chapter:-9
Shipping
Benefits:-
The Yangtze River, China’s “golden waterway,”
plays an important role in the economy of the upper river area. In that region,
river navigation is almost the only means of long-distance, cost-effective
transportation of freight. For Chongqing, the major port city in Sichuan
province, 90 percent of goods are transported by water, and navigation on the
upper Yangtze has been difficult in the past. The Three Gorges reservoir
dramatically increases the depth of water and improves navigation up to
Chongqing, more than 600 kilometers upstream of the dam. Three Gorges has been
built with one of the largest systems of ship locks in the world, permitting
large quantities of cargo to move into the upper reaches of the Yangtze. In
2006, 50 million tons of cargo passed through the new lock system up to
Chongqing, up from 18 million tons before the dam, and the 2007 estimate
exceeds 50 million tons (Peoples Daily Online 2007). 
9
Chapter:-10
Reservoir:-
Induced Seismicity and Geological
Instability Large reservoirs can cause seismic events as they fill and as the
pressure on local faults increases (ICE 1981). Such reservoir-induced
seismicity was predicted for the Three Gorges region, which is already seismically
active and indeed, there has been an increase in reported seismic activity in
the region following construction of the dam and the filling of the reservoir.
Official statements minimize the importance of this, saying that “no unusual
phenomena which could disrupt the stability of Three Gorges Dam have occurred”
– a far cry from saying that there have been no significant damages to
individuals, homes, or businesses (People’s Daily Online 2007). Related to the
risk of increased seismic activity is the risk of increased landslides in the
regions around Three Gorges with steep slopes. Landslide activity associated
with the filling of the reservoir appears to be on the rise. Very soon after
the closing of the dam and the filling of the reservoir, a major landslide
occurred near the town of 144 The World’s Water 2008–2009 Qianjiangping on the
Qinggan River near its confluence with the Yangtze mainstream. Early on the
morning of July 13, 2003, 24 million cubic meters of rock and earth slid into
the Qinggan River, completely blocking its flow, capsizing 22 boats, and
destroying four factories, 300 homes, and more than 67 hectares of farmland.
Official reports say that 14 people were killed and 10 more were listed as
missing (Wang et al. 2004). In 2007, thirty-one people died when a landslide on
a tributary to the dam in Hubei province crushed a bus (Stratton 2007). The
risk of such disruptions appears to be far more severe than anticipated and is
leading to new resettlement efforts as the danger zones around the margins of
the reservoir expand. In the fall of 2007, officials and experts admitted the
Three Gorges Dam project had caused more frequent landslides (Xinhua 2007b,c).
10
Chapter:-11
Relocation and Resettlement:-
Every large dam built in China has led to the
resettlement of local people because of the high populations and the density of
towns and villages along the major rivers. Even early in the debate over Three
Gorges, the Chinese Academy of Sciences (1988, 1995) acknowledged that large-scale
resettlement and inundation of population centers would be among the most
devastating aspects of the project. Initial estimates of the populations to be
displaced varied from around one million to almost two million. Far more than a
million people have already been resettled during the project’s construction –
official estimates typically say “at least 1.2 million” or “1.13 million”
(Yardley 2007). Other estimates range from 1.3 million to almost 2 million (Dai
1998, Chao 2001, Tan and Yao 2006). More than 100 towns are ultimately to be
submerged, including the major population centers of Fuling, Wanxian, and parts
of Chongqing. Chongqing is the central municipality in the Three Gorges
reservoir area and recently received approval to become a centrally
administered municipality – only the fourth in the country after Beijing,
Shanghai, and Tianjin. Fourteen thousand hectares of agricultural land will be
submerged, as will more than 100 archeological sites, some dating back over
12,000 years. The cities of Wanxian and Fuling have cultural histories
extending back more than 1,000 years. In fact, it now appears possible that as
many as six million people in total will have to be resettled because of the
dam and surrounding impacts.
11
Chapter:-12
Other
Issues:-
The long-term implications of the
TGD will only be understood fully over the coming decades. But it is likely to
have some unanticipated implications, beyond the signifi- cant effects already
predicted or observed. Some of these are already beginning to appear: The
magnitude of the dam and reservoir are so large that it is already playing a
role in military planning and in affecting local climatic conditions. In 2004,
the U.S. Pentagon released their annual report to Congress on military issues
related to China. In that report, the Pentagon reported that Taiwanese leaders
were considering the concept of targeting the Three Gorges Dam militarily as a
deterrent against Chinese military action against Taiwan. They wrote: “Taipei
political and military leaders have recently suggested acquiring weapon systems
capable of standoff strikes against the Chinese mainland as a cost-effective
means of deterrence. Taiwan’s Air Force already has a latent capability for
airstrikes against China. Leaders have publicly cited the need for ballistic
and land-attack cruise missiles. Since Taipei cannot match Beijing’s ability to
field offensive systems, proponents of strikes against the mainland apparently
hope that merely presenting credible threats to China’s urban population or
high-value targets, such as the Three Gorges Dam, will deter Chinese military
coercion.” (U.S. Department of Defense 2004). This comment was taken by
mainland Chinese media and political leaders as a direct threat, or as an
effort to encourage Taiwan military to develop such capability, and provoked an
angry response (Hogg 2004). people. 1932 Nationalist government proposes
building a low dam at Three Gorges. 1935 Massive flooding kills 142,000 people.
1940s The U.S. Bureau of Reclamation helps Chinese engineers identify a site.
12
Chapter:-13
Conclusion:-
The Three Gorges Dam in China is
rapidly approaching completion. This project, along with a vast array of
peripheral projects, constitutes the largest water-supply development in the
history of humanity. As with any major construction project that substantially
modifies or alters a watershed, the Three Gorges Dam will have significant
costs and benefits. Among the most significant benefits are the generation of
electricity without greenhouse gas emissions, improvements in navigation, and
potential reductions in flood risk. Among the most significant costs are
massive dislocations of millions of Chinese to make way for the dam and
reservoir, further ecological degradation of the Yangtze River ecosystem and
fisheries, a reduction in sedimentation reaching the East China Sea, and a
growing risk of new landslides and reservoir induced seismicity. Over decades,
the overall implications of the project will become more evident, but before
the full benefits have begun to be delivered, the environmental, social,
political, and economic costs are beginning to accumulate. Even official
government spokesmen are beginning to question the substantial human and
environmental costs of the project, while other officials are moving rapidly
forward on new massive water infrastructure elsewhere in China, without having
learned the lessons from Three Gorges. Long-term sustainable water management
in China will require a better balancing of the true costs and benefits of
their water choices.
Three gorges
dam has set new benchmark in
construction engineering. And has pushed engg. To its new limits. So it an
ultimate mega structure unless an another bigger is built.
13
Chapter:-14
REFERENCES:-
Adams, P. 1997. Planning for disaster: China’s
Three Gorges Dam.
http://www.multinationalmonitor.org/hyper/issues/1993/09/mm0993_08.html
Boyle, C.E. 2007. Water-borne Illness in
China. China Environmental Health
Project,
Research Brief. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for
Scholars. August 2007
. Carrell,
S. 2004. HSBC under fire for its role in £870m bond sale to finance China’s
megadams.
The
Independent, July 25. Chao, J. 2001. Relocation for giant dam inflames Chinese
peasants. National Geographic News, May 15, 2001.
14